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 OPINION 
                      
 
 
 
  
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Claimants are the widow and son of a deceased diver and 
dockbuilder.  They appeal the decision of the United States 
Department of Labor, Benefits Review Board ("Board"), which held 
that the decedent's employer was not required to pay benefits 
under the Longshore Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
901, et seq., ("LHWCA") due to statutory exemption and credit 
provisions which applied as a result of a court-approved 
settlement of their previous federal court litigation.  The 
employer has filed a protective cross-appeal solely to preserve 
its right to have this court examine the employment status of the 
decedent in the event that we reverse the Board on the release 
and credit issues. 
 We will affirm the order of the Board that the decedent 
was a harbor worker, not a seaman.  Although the Board concluded 
that the employer could receive a full credit under either § 
903(e) or § 933(f), we hold that only when these two sections are 
applied together do they provide a credit to the employer where 
the apportionment of funds between prior settled claims is 
unknown.  The Board concluded that the "written approval" 
requirement of § 933(g)(1) does not apply.  We will affirm the 
order of the Board, however, on other grounds.  Next, we will 
affirm its determination that the notice provision of § 933(g)(2) 
was satisfied by virtue of the employer's participation in the 
tort settlement.  Finally, we will reverse the order of the Board 
that the claimants are not entitled to any benefits under the 
  
LHWCA and remand this case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
   
 
 
 I. 
 A. Factual History 
 Howard Bundens ("decedent") was employed by J.E. 
Brenneman Co. ("Brenneman") as a diver and dockbuilder on a 
variety of marine construction jobs.  On August 29, 1978, 
decedent had been assigned with other employees of Brenneman to 
the Monsanto pier on the Delaware River to remove a damaged 
mooring platform, known as a dolphin.  A tug boat towed 
Brenneman's heavy-lifting derrick barge, the Conqueror, to the 
Monsanto main pier where it picked up the decedent together with 
the other members of the crew.  Before going down-river to the 
area of the broken dolphin, the Conqueror attached an anchor 
cable from its bow to the main pier.  The tug then towed the 
barge some distance past the site of the broken dolphin.  At that 
location, the Conqueror set an anchor off its stern.  The tug 
next brought the Conqueror back near the site of the broken 
dolphin and departed.  By pulling itself with its winches along 
the cables at its bow and stern, the Conqueror was able to 
maneuver along the pier to facilitate cutting and removal of the 
damaged dolphin. 
 The decedent and other workers performed this work by 
using torches to cut the steel H-beam supports underneath the 
  
dolphin, while the Conqueror's 90-ton derrick supported the 
weight of the dolphin.  The workers did the cutting work from 
planks fastened to the beams under the dolphin and from float 
stages, which were floating wooden work platforms about forty 
feet long.  When the dolphin was cut free, the derrick lifted it 
onto the deck of the barge. 
 After this task was accomplished, the decedent walked 
back to the main pier via the shoreline.  Meanwhile, the crew 
made ready to move the Conqueror to a location at Monsanto's main 
pier where it was to be secured for the night.  The Conqueror 
maneuvered itself down-river to weigh its stern anchor and then 
pulled itself back up-river along its bow cable approximately 300 
feet past the damaged pier to the main pier.  Once the Conqueror 
arrived at the site at the main pier where Brenneman intended to 
moor her overnight, several lines were heaved to the decedent and 
another worker on the pier, and the anchor cable at the bow was 
unfastened. 
 A strong wind caused the bow of the Conqueror to "hang 
up" behind a piling at the pier and, simultaneously, the stern 
pitched out into the river.  Decedent went on board the Conqueror 
to help pull the aft end of the barge closer to the pier.  
Several workers, including the decedent, rigged an additional 
mooring line from a point on the pier, around and through various 
points at the stern of the barge, and along the starboard side.  
The line continued through a fair lead block, also known as the 
main snatch block (which was affixed to the deck), and then onto 
a winch drum or spool.  Once the line was through this last fair 
  
lead block, the decedent took the end of the line and wrapped it 
several times around the spool.  Due to the tension on the 
mooring line created by the spool, without warning the fair lead 
block broke.  The decedent was killed almost instantly when he 
was struck by either a piece of the broken fair lead block or the 
ruptured line.1 
 
  B. Procedural History 
 Barbara Bundens ("Bundens"), on behalf of herself, her 
minor son, Gregory Bundens, and her deceased husband's estate, 
filed a tort action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on March 13, 1979.2  The next 
day, Bundens filed a claim for death benefits on behalf of 
herself and her son under the LHWCA.  Bundens contacted the 
Deputy Commissioner of the Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs to request that the LHWCA claim be held in abeyance 
pending the termination of the federal court action.  In the 
federal court action, Bundens asserted claims against Brenneman 
both under the Jones Act and as the vessel owner for negligence 
under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) of the LHWCA.3  When Brenneman joined 
                     
1
.  When the decedent was struck, his right arm was amputated and 
he received lacerations of the liver, diaphragm, and one of his 
lungs.  App. at 25. 
2
.  All references to "Bundens" will be understood to include her 
son, Gregory, unless it becomes necessary to make a distinction, 
in which case we will refer to Barbara Bundens as "Barbara" and 
to Gregory Bundens as "Gregory." 
3
.  The complaint stated as follows:  "Plaintiff brings this 
action pursuant to the general maritime law of the United States 
  
(..continued) 
and/or the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 . . . ."  App. at 26.  
Brenneman argues in its answering brief (and at oral argument) 
that a § 905(b) claim was never asserted in the complaint and 
that they have been unable to determine if an amended complaint 
was filed which set forth such a claim.  Brenneman's answering 
brief at 14 n.3.  Bundens argues that although § 905(b) was never 
asserted as such in the complaint, throughout the federal court 
litigation, she maintained that Brenneman was liable for 
negligence pursuant to § 905(b).  In fact, the district court 
judge who signed the order, App. at 84a, settling the federal 
tort suit referenced and approved Bundens' Motion for Approval of 
Settlement which stated: 
 
 Plaintiff's alternative claims against 
Brenneman were that the decedent was a seaman 
and that Brenneman, as vessel owner, had 
breached its warranty of seaworthiness or if 
the decedent was not a seaman, Brenneman as 
vessel owner, was liable because of its 
negligence pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).  
 
App. at 87a (emphasis added). 
 We are unable to find anywhere in the district court 
record an objection by Brenneman that the complaint did not set 
forth a § 905(b) claim.  Additionally, there is no indication 
that Brenneman, at the time the settlement was approved, objected 
to Bundens' characterization of the federal court litigation as 
including a § 905(b) claim.  Furthermore, as stated above, this 
characterization of the federal court litigation was accepted by 
the district judge. 
 Section 905(b) of the LHWCA states in relevant part: 
 
 Negligence of Vessel.  In the event of injury 
to a person covered under this chapter caused 
by the negligence of a vessel, then such 
person, or anyone otherwise entitled to 
recover damages by reason thereof, may bring 
an action against such vessel as a third 
party in accordance with the provisions of 
section 933 of this title, and the employer 
shall not be liable to the vessel for such 
damages directly or indirectly and any 
agreements or warranties to the contrary 
shall be void. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988). 
 The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA added § 905(b) which 
provided that a longshore worker employed directly by the vessel 
owner could file suit against his or her employer with certain 
  
additional parties as third-party defendants, Bundens filed suits 
against these parties as direct defendants.4 
 Brenneman filed a motion for summary judgment on 
December 9, 1981, claiming that as a matter of law the decedent 
was not a seaman under the Jones Act.  Bundens by cross-motion 
for summary judgment claimed that the decedent was either a 
seaman under the Jones Act or a harbor worker under the LHWCA.  
The district court denied both motions. 
(..continued) 
limited exceptions.  The Supreme Court affirmed this dual 
capacity doctrine in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 
U.S. 523, 528-32, 103 S. Ct. 2541, 2546-48 (1983), thus 
confirming that an employee can sue his employer as vessel owner. 
 In 1984, § 905(b) was amended to prohibit recovery by 
an employee against an employer for negligence if the employer is 
the owner of the vessel and the employee is engaged in 
shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services.  The amended 
provision, however, only applies to injuries sustained after 
September 28, 1984, approximately five years after the filing of 
the federal tort suit.  Therefore, when the suit was initiated, 
Bundens, regardless of her husband's duties, was able to maintain 
a negligence action in federal court against Brenneman, who was 
owner of the barge. 
4
.  Specifically, Bundens filed suit against the following 
companies:  (1) Independent Lighterage Company ("Independent") -- 
the company that sold the barge, Conqueror, to Brenneman; (2) A. 
Moe & Company, Inc. ("A. Moe") -- the company that performed 
repair and testing services on the vessel; (3) Universal 
Technical Testing Laboratories, Inc. ("Universal") -- the company 
that performed tests and inspections of the blocks and associated 
gear of the vessel; (4) Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation 
("Merritt") -- the builder of the barge; and (5) Raymond 
International Builders, Inc. and its parent company, Raymond 
International, Inc. (collectively "Raymond") -- the companies 
that later took control of the assets of the builder and sold the 
barge to Independent.  She sued all five parties alleging 
negligence.  Additionally, she sued Merritt and Raymond alleging 
strict products liability. 
  
 Extensive settlement negotiations ensued, after which 
Bundens and all defendants entered into a comprehensive 
settlement of the federal litigation.  The settlement provided 
for: (1) a Release Agreement ("Release") between Bundens and 
Brenneman; (2) an Indemnity Agreement ("Indemnity") between the 
same parties; and (3) a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release 
("Settlement") among all of the co-defendants. 
 The Release provided that in exchange for one million 
dollars, Bundens released Brenneman (but not any compensation 
insurance carrier) from all tort claims arising out of and 
related to the death of the decedent.  The Release was structured 
in such a way as to preserve Bundens' right to pursue the LHWCA 
claim for death benefits that had been filed earlier.  The 
Release also preserved any factual or legal contentions that 
could be raised in the LHWCA proceedings, including a defense by 
the compensation carrier that its liability had been discharged 
by virtue of the federal court settlement.5 
                     
5
.  The Release stated in relevant part: 
 
 It is specifically understood that the 
Releasor [Bundens] may pursue and prosecute a 
claim for compensation benefits under the 
[LHWCA] on behalf of herself and Gregory 
Bundens, a minor, which claim Releasor 
represents has previously been filed.  The 
parties hereto intend that this release shall 
be without prejudice to the factual and legal 
contentions which may be raised in any future 
compensation proceedings by Releasor and by 
Brenneman's compensation insurer or 
underwriter.  Neither the execution and 
acceptance of this release, nor the payment 
and acceptance, nor the payment and 
acceptance of the consideration recited 
  
 The Indemnity was designed to ensure that Brenneman 
would not have to pay in excess of one million dollars as a 
consequence of decedent's death.  Thus, in the event that 
Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers"),6 made a claim against 
Brenneman for reimbursement for any monies paid to Bundens as 
compensation benefits under the LHWCA, Bundens agreed to 
indemnify and hold Brenneman harmless from any liability, 
including counsel fees.  The Indemnity anticipated that, if 
Travelers were to succeed in an action against Brenneman, the 
amount of benefits already paid to Bundens, combined with 
Brenneman's costs and counsel fees incurred in defending 
Travelers' indemnity claim, would not exceed $400,000.  
Accordingly, the Indemnity specified the sum of $400,000 to be 
(..continued) 
herein, shall estop or be deemed to estop the 
Releasor, Brenneman, its insurers or 
underwriters or any entities or persons 
appearing on its behalf, from raising or 
proving any factual or legal contentions in 
such compensation proceedings, which they 
would otherwise be entitled to raise and 
prove.  Nothing herein shall be construed as 
preventing the compensation carrier from 
defending the compensation claim on the basis 
that its liability is discharged because this 
Agreement constitutes settlement of a "third 
party claim", or as preventing the Releasor 
from contending that such defense is 
inapplicable. 
 
App. at 93a-94a (emphasis added). 
6
.  Travelers was Brenneman's compensation carrier under the 
LHWCA.  However, as an owner and operator of vessels, Brenneman 
was insured by Continental Insurance Co. ("Continental").  The 
policy that Brenneman had with Continental insured Brenneman 
against claims by its employees under the Jones Act and general 
maritime law. 
  
set aside out of the $1,000,000 paid to Bundens under the 
Release. 
 The Settlement executed among all of the defendants in 
the district court litigation dismissed with prejudice all of the 
Bundens' claims.7  It also fixed the respective amount that each 
defendant would contribute to the $1,000,000 settlement 
established in the Release.8  
                     
7
.  Bundens was not a party to and did not sign this settlement 
agreement and mutual release, but she is referenced in the 
document as follows: 
 
 WHEREAS, in consideration of the payment of 
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) by 
negotiable instrument(s), in United States 
currency, receipt of which shall be 
acknowledged by Bundens for all those 
entitled to recover for the wrongful death of 
Howard E. Bundens, deceased, Bundens has 
agreed to dismiss with prejudice all of the 
aforementioned lawsuits against Defendants 
and has agreed to release and indemnify 
Brenneman as specifically set forth in the 
Release Agreement and Indemnity Agreement 
attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B", 
respectively, and incorporated herein by 
reference . . . . 
 
App. at 63 (emphasis added).   
 As we understand the terms of the settlement, Bundens' 
approval of the settlement was conditioned on her receiving a 
total of $1,000,000 from any or all of the defendants.  Likewise, 
Brenneman's approval of the settlement was conditioned on its 
paying no more than $861,600.  Thus, as we will later explain, 
although Bundens signed a settlement agreement only with 
Brenneman, she necessarily settled the lawsuits with all of the 
other defendants at the same time.  (NOTE:  All monetary amounts 
in this opinion will be rounded to the nearest dollar.)    
8
.  The $1,000,000 was to be funded by the defendants as follows: 
 
 a.)  Brenneman  $861,600 
 b.)  Independent $ 41,700 
 c.)  A. Moe  $ 20,000 
  
 Although Travelers was invited to participate in the 
settlement negotiations, it declined.  After the settlement was 
reached on June 8, 1983, Travelers filed a motion to intervene in 
the federal court litigation with the intention of opposing the 
settlement as an attempt by Bundens to receive a double recovery.  
The motion to intervene was denied on the grounds that Travelers 
was not prejudiced by the settlement. 
 The district court approved the Settlement Agreement 
and the dismissal of the federal court tort litigation in July of 
1983.9  Because the lawsuit was dismissed when the parties agreed 
upon a settlement, the district court never adjudicated whether 
the decedent was a seaman or a harbor worker. 
 After the case was settled, Bundens pursued her claim 
for compensation benefits under the LHWCA.  An evidentiary 
hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and 
in January of 1986, the ALJ issued a decision and order 
(..continued) 
 d.)  Universal  $  5,000  
 e.)  Raymond  $ 41,700 
 f.)  Merritt  $ 30,000 
 
 Pursuant to the Release, Brenneman was to pay the 
$1,000,000 to Bundens.  It was the responsibility of Brenneman to 
collect contribution from the other defendants. 
9
.  In a later order, the district judge approved Bundens' 
attorneys' fees request for one-third of the recovery, and 
reimbursement for costs in the amount of $20,589.  The balance of 
the settlement funds ($646,078) was apportioned 70% to Barbara 
and 30% to the guardian of Gregory.  Thus, the net recoveries 
from the settlement were: 
 
 Barbara Bundens $452,255 
 Gregory Bundens $193,823 
  
concluding that the decedent satisfied all three prongs of the 
Griffith test for crew member status and was therefore a seaman.  
Griffith requires that: (1) a worker have a more or less 
permanent connection with a vessel; (2) the vessel be in 
navigation; and (3) the worker must be on board primarily to aid 
in navigation.  Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 
F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054, 96 S. 
Ct. 785 (1976).  The ALJ dismissed Bundens' claim for benefits 
after concluding that the decedent was expressly excluded from 
coverage under § 902(3) of the LHWCA because he was a seaman, not 
a harbor worker.10 
 On appeal to the Board, Bundens challenged the ALJ's 
determination that her husband was on board the barge Conqueror 
primarily to aid in navigation.  The Board concluded that the 
ALJ's finding was neither supported by the record evidence nor 
applicable law.  Accordingly, it reversed the ALJ's finding that 
the decedent was a seaman excluded from coverage under the LHWCA.  
The Board additionally noted that it did not need to reach 
Bundens' challenge to the ALJ's finding that the decedent had a 
                     
10
.  Section 902 of the LHWCA states in relevant part: 
 
 When used in this chapter -- (3) The term 
"employee" means any person engaged in 
maritime employment, including any 
longshoreman or other person engaged in 
longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker 
including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and 
ship-breaker, but such term does not include 
-- (G) a master or member of a crew of any 
vessel. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988).  
  
permanent connection to a vessel, because the Board's holding 
nullified the ALJ's determination of seaman status on other 
grounds.  It remanded the case for the ALJ to determine if 
Bundens was entitled to LHWCA benefits, and whether Brenneman was 
entitled to statutory credit under § 903(e) for its payment under 
the tort settlement agreement.11 
 On remand another ALJ found that Bundens was entitled 
to benefits under the LHWCA, and rejected Brenneman's argument 
that it was entitled to a credit under § 903(e).  The ALJ 
reasoned that Brenneman would be entitled to § 903(e) credit only 
if the tort settlement disposed of the claims under the Jones 
Act, but not if it disposed of Bundens' § 905(b) claim under the 
LHWCA.  The ALJ further noted that this issue was not decided in 
the federal litigation.12  According to the ALJ, the settling 
                     
11
.  Section 903(e) of the LHWCA states: 
 
 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
any amounts paid to an employee for the same 
injury, disability, or death for which 
benefits are claimed under this chapter 
pursuant to any other workers' compensation 
law or section 688 of title 46, Appendix [the 
Jones Act] (relating to recovery for injury 
to or death of seamen) shall be credited 
against any liability imposed by this 
chapter. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 903(e) (1988) (emphasis added).  
12
.  Had there been a judicial determination of the decedent's 
employment status, the case before us would be quite different.  
If there had been an adjudication that the decedent was a seaman, 
then Bundens would be legally precluded from recovering 
compensation benefits under the LHWCA because only harbor workers 
can recover under the LHWCA.  Conversely, if there had been a 
judicial determination that the decedent was a harbor worker, he 
would not have been entitled to recover under the Jones Act and 
  
parties intended the nature of the settlement to depend on the 
decedent's status as a seaman under the Jones Act or as a harbor 
worker under the LHWCA, as later determined in the LHWCA 
proceeding.  The ALJ concluded that Bundens was a harbor 
worker,13 and that the tort settlement disposed of the claims 
under § 905(b) of the LHWCA, rather than under the Jones Act.  He 
therefore concluded that Brenneman was not entitled to a credit 
under § 903(e). 
 In a supplemental petition for further consideration 
following denial upon reconsideration, Brenneman argued that the 
ALJ must revisit the issue of the decedent's employment status in 
light of recent Supreme Court precedent which eliminated the "aid 
in navigation" element of the seaman status test.  McDermott 
Int'l v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 353, 111 S. Ct. 807, 816 (1991).  
Since Wilander was decided after the decisions of the Board and 
ALJ, the Board could not have considered it when remanding the 
case.  The order of the Board was erroneously premised on the 
view that because the evidence had not supported the finding of 
the first ALJ that the decedent did not aid in navigation, he 
could not be a seaman.  On remand, the ALJ acknowledged that the 
"aid in navigation" element is no longer applicable, but that the 
(..continued) 
all of the money obtained from the federal tort settlement would 
be attributable to the § 905(b) negligence claim. 
13
.  The ALJ made the following findings: (1) the decedent's 
duties included diving and dockbuilding; (2) the decedent's job 
on the date of his death was that of a wharf and dockbuilder; and 
(3) during the last three years of his employment, the decedent 
spent approximately one-third of his employment as a diver and 
two-thirds as a dockbuilder. 
  
decedent was still a harbor worker because: (1) he engaged in 
traditional longshore (harbor worker) activities; and (2) the 
barge was not a "vessel in navigation" since at the time of 
decedent's death, it was simply being secured at the dock for the 
night.  All parties concede that this latter finding by the ALJ 
was clearly error since Brenneman and Bundens had stipulated to 
the fact that the barge was a "vessel in navigation."      
 Brenneman appealed the decisions of the ALJ and also 
argued that Bundens' compensation claim was barred under § 
933(g), because she had failed to obtain Travelers' written 
consent to the settlement.14  After reviewing the factual 
                     
14
.  Section 933(g) of the LHWCA states in relevant part: 
 
 Compromise obtained by person entitled to compensation. 
 
 (1) If the person entitled to compensation 
(or the person's representative) enters into 
a settlement with a third person referred to 
in subsection (a) of this section for an 
amount less than the compensation to which 
the person (or the person's representative) 
would be entitled under this chapter, the 
employer shall be liable for compensation as 
determined under subsection (f) of this 
section only if written approval of the 
settlement is obtained from the employer and 
the employer's carrier, before the settlement 
is executed, and by the person entitled to 
compensation (or the person's 
representative). 
 
 (2) If no written approval of the settlement 
is obtained and filed as required by 
paragraph (1), or if the employee fails to 
notify the employer of any settlement 
obtained from or judgment rendered against a 
third person, all rights to compensation and 
medical benefits under this chapter shall be 
terminated, regardless of whether the 
  
findings of the ALJ, the Board affirmed the determination of the 
ALJ that the decedent was a harbor worker and not a seaman, thus 
entitling Bundens to $335,75415 in LHWCA benefits.  The Board 
reasoned that the determination by the ALJ that the decedent was 
primarily a dockbuilder who performed construction, salvage, and 
repair work, was reasonable and supported by evidence in the 
record.  The Board did not address the fact that the ALJ had 
erred by finding that the vessel was not "in navigation." 
 With respect to the § 903(e) credit issue, the Board 
agreed with Brenneman that the company was entitled to a credit 
for its net payment in settlement of the federal court 
litigation.16  It reasoned that the settlement did not delineate 
how the settlement money was apportioned between the two claims.  
Therefore, the Board concluded that it was error for the ALJ to 
rely on the subsequent LHWCA proceedings to determine that 
(..continued) 
employer or the employer's insurer has made 
payments or acknowledged entitlement to 
benefits under this chapter. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 933(g) (1988) (emphasis added). 
15
.  The $335,754 was allocated as follows: 
 
 Barbara Bundens $100,628 
 Gregory Bundens $232,205 
 
We note that the above figures total $332,833 and not $335,754.  
We are uncertain why there is a difference of $2,921.  However, 
because of our final disposition of this case, the discrepancy is 
irrelevant.   
16
.  As mentioned previously, although the gross settlement was 
$1,000,000, after attorneys' fees and costs, the net settlement 
was $646,078. 
  
Bundens was a harbor worker and then to attribute the settlement 
exclusively to Bundens' § 905(b) claim.  The Board concluded that 
since the record was unclear as to how the settlement amount was 
to be apportioned between the Jones Act and the LHWCA claim, 
Brenneman was entitled to offset the net amount of the settlement 
against its liability under the LHWCA. 
 The Board held in the alternative that even if 
Brenneman could not claim a credit under § 903(e), it would still 
be entitled to a credit under § 933(f) which provides a credit 
for an employer where a claimant recovers an amount in a suit 
against a third party for which compensation is payable under the 
LHWCA.17  The Board concluded that because Bundens had filed suit 
and recovered against third parties, Brenneman was entitled to 
offset the net amount of the third party recovery against its 
                     
17
.  Section 933(f) states: 
 
 Institution of proceedings by person entitled 
to compensation. 
 
 If the person entitled to compensation 
institutes proceedings within the period 
prescribed in subsection (b) of this section 
the employer shall be required to pay as 
compensation under this chapter a sum equal 
to the excess of the amount which the 
Secretary determines is payable on account of 
such injury or death over the net amount 
recovered against such third person.  Such 
net amount shall be equal to the actual 
amount recovered less the expenses reasonably 
incurred by such person in respect to such 
proceedings (including reasonable attorneys' 
fees). 
 
33 U.S.C. § 933(f) (1988). 
  
LHWCA liability.18  Thus, the Board modified the ALJ's decision 
to allow Brenneman a full credit for the net amount of the 
settlement.        
 The Board rejected Brenneman's defense under § 
933(g)(1), concluding that this subsection only applies where the 
amount recovered from a settlement is less than the amount of 
compensation due.  It reasoned that Bundens received a net 
recovery of $646,078 from the federal court tort settlement, and 
would only be entitled to $335,754 under the LHWCA, an amount 
less than the net recovery from the one million dollar 
settlement.  Under these circumstances, the Board ruled that § 
933(g)(2) applied, which required Bundens to provide Brenneman 
with notice of the settlement.  It found that this requirement 
was fulfilled here since Brenneman had been a party to the 
settlement agreement. 
 We have before us the appeal by Bundens of the decision 
of the Board which held that Brenneman was entitled to a credit 
pursuant to § 903(e) or § 933(f) of the LHWCA as a result of the 
court-approved settlement of Bundens' federal court litigation.  
Additionally, we have the cross-appeal by Brenneman challenging:  
(1) the Board's decision to affirm the ALJ's finding that the 
                     
18
.  In its discussion, the Board never specified whether 
Brenneman, the employer, was to be considered a "third person" 
for the purposes of § 933(f).  However, the Board did imply that 
the employer was a third person because the Board treated the 
entire net settlement recovery ($646,078) as a third party 
settlement, instead of looking only to money that was contributed 
by the defendants other than Brenneman.   
  
decedent was a harbor worker; and (2) the Board's rejection of 
Brenneman's § 933(g) defense. 
 
 II. 
 On review of an award of benefits under the LHWCA, the 
factual findings of an Administrative Law Judge are binding on 
the Benefits Review Board if they are rational, supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and consistent 
with applicable law.  33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3) (1988); Elliot Coal 
Mining Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 
17 F.3d 616, 625-26 (3d Cir. 1994).  We review the Board's 
decision for the limited purpose of determining whether it 
committed an error of law.  A Board decision that sets aside 
findings of an ALJ that are supported by substantial evidence is 
legally erroneous.  Elliot Coal, 17 F.3d at 626.  
 
 A.  Employment Status of the Decedent 
 Initially, we note that the test for ascertaining 
whether an employee is a member of a crew under the LHWCA is the 
same as that for determining seaman status under the Jones Act.  
See Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 371, 77 S. 
Ct. 415, 416 (1957).  Thus, a conclusion that a worker is a 
seaman necessarily precludes recovery under the LHWCA.  
Conversely, a determination that a worker is not a member of a 
crew permits recovery under the LHWCA.  See Wilander, 498 U.S. at 
353, 111 S. Ct. at 817 ("We now recognize that the LHWCA is one 
of a pair of mutually exclusive remedial statutes that 
  
distinguish between land-based and sea-based maritime 
employees.").  The test to determine seaman status was identified 
in Griffith: (1) the vessel must be in navigation; (2) the worker 
must have a more or less permanent connection with the vessel; 
and (3) the worker must be aboard primarily to aid in navigation.  
521 F.2d at 36.  The Supreme Court later modified this test in 
Wilander, holding that, "the time has come to jettison the aid in 
navigation language."  498 U.S. at 353, 111 S. Ct. at 816.  The 
Court reasoned that there was no indication in either the Jones 
Act or the LHWCA that Congress intended to exclude traditional 
seamen who do not aid in navigation.  498 U.S. at 354, 111 S. Ct 
at 817.  Thus, the Court held in order to qualify for coverage 
under the Jones Act, the employee must: (1) have an "employment-
related connection to a vessel in navigation"; and (2) 
"`contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the 
accomplishment of its mission.'"  498 U.S. at 355, 111 S. Ct. 817 
(citing Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 
1959).  Stated differently, the second element does not require 
that "a seaman aid in navigation . . . of the vessel, but a 
seaman must be doing the ship's work."  Id. 
 Because Wilander was not decided until 1991, that 
opinion was not considered by the second ALJ until raised by 
Brenneman in its supplemental petition following denial upon 
reconsideration.  Brenneman argues that even after considering 
Wilander, the ALJ again erred by assuming that the barge 
Conqueror was not a vessel in navigation despite a stipulation by 
the parties to the contrary.  We are called upon to determine 
  
whether the Board properly affirmed the decision of the second 
ALJ regarding the status of the decedent as a harbor worker 
despite these factual and legal errors. 
 In the decision rendered on remand, the ALJ made 
findings of fact and concluded that the decedent was a harbor 
worker for the following reasons: (1) the decedent's duties 
included diving and dockbuilding; (2) the decedent's job on the 
date of his death was that of a wharf and dockbuilder; and (3) 
during the last three years of his employment, the decedent spent 
approximately one-third of his employment as a diver and two-
thirds as a dockbuilder.  In his Decision and Order Denying 
Supplemental Petition following reconsideration, the ALJ rejected 
Brenneman's argument that the decedent was a seaman by virtue of 
his performing the work of the barge Conqueror at the time of his 
death.  The ALJ found that the decedent was engaged in the 
traditional longshore activity of repairing a dock or a pier at 
the time of his death, and that he was on the barge to accomplish 
a longshore function.  The ALJ further concluded that although 
the decedent maintained some connection with vessels, and with 
the Conqueror in particular, his primary duties were related to 
construction work as a dockbuilder, and his diving activities did 
not constitute his predominant employment activities. 
 Although the ALJ erroneously concluded that the vessel 
was not in navigation, the ALJ's determination that the decedent 
was not a seaman was reasonable, supported by evidence in the 
record, and in accordance with controlling precedent.  Prior to 
finding seaman status, Wilander mandates that the employee must 
  
have an employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation 
and the employee's duties must contribute to the function of the 
vessel or the accomplishment of its mission.  The factual finding 
of the ALJ that the decedent was engaged in traditional longshore 
activity may well have persuaded him that the decedent did not 
have an employment-related connection with a vessel sufficient to 
satisfy the first prong of the Wilander test.19  Because at least 
one of the elements of the Wilander test was not satisfied, it 
was not improper for the ALJ to conclude that the decedent was a 
harbor worker, despite his erroneous conclusion that the vessel 
was not in navigation. 
 Additionally, despite the fact that the barge was in 
navigation, the Board found support for the ALJ's determination 
in its findings that:  (1) he kept his diving equipment at home; 
(2) he commuted to work and received his diving assignments on 
                     
19
.  We in no way mean to suggest that a worker who engages in 
longshore activity may never be considered a seaman.  Had we been 
sitting as the finder of fact in this matter, we may not 
necessarily have reached the same conclusion as the ALJ.  As 
noted by the Supreme Court in Wilander: 
 
 The inquiry into seaman status is of 
necessity fact-specific; it will depend on 
the nature of the vessel, and the employee's 
precise relation to it . . . .  "[W]hether an 
individual was a `seaman' . . . depends 
largely on the facts of the particular case 
and the activity in which he was engaged at 
the time of injury." 
 
498 U.S. at 356, 111 S. Ct. at 818 (citation omitted).  However, 
due to our deferential standard of review, we hold that the 
conclusions of the ALJ as affirmed by the Board are rational, 
supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with applicable 
law. 
  
shore; (3) he never ate or slept on the vessel; (4) his duties 
included diving and dockbuilding; (5) his job title on the date 
of his death was "wharf and dockbuilder;" (6) he was a member of 
the Wharf and Dockbuilders and Pile Drivers Union; (7) his 
dockbuilding duties remained the same whether he was working on 
land or on the barges; and (8) he spent approximately two-thirds 
of his time as a dockbuilder and only one-third as a diver during 
the last three years of his employment.20  In reviewing the 
decision of the Board, we conclude that it did not err in 
upholding the finding of the ALJ that the decedent was a harbor 
worker by virtue of his primary duties which related to 
construction work as a dockbuilder.   
 
 B.  Applicability of § 903(e) and § 933(f) 
 The ALJ reasoned that the only way to ascertain if the 
§ 903(e) exemption applied was to first determine if the 
settlement funds were paid to settle a Jones Act claim or a § 
905(b) negligence claim under the LHWCA.  He determined that if 
the monies were paid to settle a Jones Act claim, then Brenneman 
would be entitled to statutory credit under § 903(e).  He further 
                     
20
.  In reaching its decision, the Board recited from the record 
several additional facts not found in the ALJ's prior decision.  
Admittedly, the Board conducted some "fact-gathering" of its own.  
We hesitate to refer to the Board's action as fact-finding, 
because the facts averred to in its opinion were stipulated to 
and, hence, undisputed.  However, without commenting on the 
propriety of the Board's action in "gathering" such facts, we 
simply note that the ALJ's findings of fact that the Board did 
refer to would be sufficient, by themselves, to uphold a 
determination that the decedent was a harbor worker.  
  
concluded that if the monies were paid to settle a LHWCA 
negligence claim under § 905(b), then Brenneman would not be 
entitled to a credit under § 903(e).  The ALJ assumed that since 
it was the intention of all the parties in the settlement 
agreement to allow Bundens to pursue her LHWCA claim, it was 
clear that the payment was not a settlement of the Jones Act 
claim.  On appeal, the Board held that when the record is unclear 
as to how the settlement fund is apportioned among the various 
claims being settled, the employer is entitled to offset the net 
amount against its liability under the LHWCA.  Bundens argues 
that the wording of the Release clearly indicated that no one 
intended to foreclose her rights to collect benefits under the 
LHWCA.21   
 Additionally, Bundens argues that since the § 903(e) 
credit is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is not on 
her to prove that the settlement fund was allocated to the LHWCA 
claim, but rather it is the burden of Brenneman to show that the 
settlement monies were allocated to the Jones Act claim.22 
                     
21
.  See supra note 5. 
22
.  Because of our discussion below, we need not address 
Bundens' argument concerning the allocation of the burden of 
proof in the context of § 903(e).  However, we note that this 
issue has been addressed by other Courts of Appeals in analogous 
cases.  For example, in Force v. Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, 938 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1991), the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held: 
 
 LHWCA's "overall humanitarian policy" of 
compensating employees for their injuries 
requires that "all doubtful questions of fact 
be resolved in favor of the injured 
employee."  Placing the burden of proof on 
  
 We believe the correct approach in addressing the 
credit issue is the view espoused by the Director of the Office 
of Workers' Compensation Programs ("Director").  The Director 
argues that it is unnecessary to determine how the settlement 
funds were apportioned between the Jones Act claim and the § 
905(b) claim under the LHWCA because the combination of the 
credit and offset provisions of § 903(e) and § 933(f) would 
provide a full credit to the employer for amounts it actually 
paid.23 
 Before explaining how the combined application of § 
903(e) and § 933(f) works to provide the employer with a credit 
for funds already paid in the tort settlement, we must first 
address Bundens' contention that § 933(f) does not apply in these 
proceedings.  Bundens argues that § 933(f) was never properly 
(..continued) 
employers is particularly appropriate in the 
context of [a credit provision] because the 
employer remains liable for the full amount 
of the statutory compensation absent a 
showing that the claimant has [already] been 
compensated by a third party. 
 
(citation omitted).  See also I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. 
Sellman, 967 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1992) ("We therefore 
conclude that it is both logical and consistent with the Act to 
impose the burden of proof [of apportionment] upon the 
employer."), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).  
These cases, however, deal with the burden of proving the 
apportionment of funds between multiple parties, whereas here we 
are dealing with the apportionment of funds between multiple 
claims.    
23
.  The Director argues that it is not only unnecessary to 
determine the apportionment of the settlement funds between the 
two claims asserted in the federal tort litigation, but that it 
is impossible to ever know how the settlement funds were 
apportioned.    
  
raised by Brenneman in the proceedings before the ALJ or the 
Board and thus Brenneman has waived its right to assert § 933(f).  
Bundens thus contends it was error for the Board to raise this 
offset provision, sua sponte.  We conclude that a § 933(f) 
defense was raised. 
 Initially, we observe that Brenneman explicitly raised 
a § 933(g) defense.  Since § 933(f) governs the offset of third-
party settlements in the event that the requirements of § 933(g) 
have been met, the Board's consideration of Brenneman's § 
933(g)(1) defense fairly included consideration of § 933(f).  
Next, even Bundens concedes that "§ 933(g)(1) refers to the 
employer's compensation liability under 33 U.S.C. § 933(f)."  
Bundens' answering brief at 19.  Additionally, we observe that in 
the settlement agreement signed by Bundens, the following 
language was present: 
 
 Nothing herein shall be construed as 
preventing the compensation carrier from 
defending the compensation claim on the basis 
that its liability is discharged because this 
Agreement constitutes settlement of a "third 
party claim", or as preventing the Releasor 
from contending that such defense is 
inapplicable. 
App. at 94a.  While this language has no bearing on the credit 
issues that were actually raised by Brenneman in the LHWCA 
proceedings, we observe that the "third party claim" language 
explicitly refers to § 933(f).  The combination of the fact that 
Brenneman actually raised § 933(g) with the explicit reservation 
of its right to raise the § 933(f) defense suffice to put Bundens 
  
on notice.  We also note that the failure of Brenneman to exhaust 
its administrative remedies is not so troubling here because all 
of the findings necessary to apply § 933(f) are included in the 
findings for either § 903(e) or § 933(g). 
 Next, Bundens argues that even if § 933(f) has not been 
waived by Brenneman, this provision does not apply here because 
an employer cannot be a "third person" within the meaning of § 
933(f).  The question before the Court is whether an employer who 
settles a negligence suit under § 905(b), when it is acting in 
its capacity as a vessel owner, is considered a third person 
under § 933(f).  We believe that the only meaningful 
interpretation of § 933(f) is to treat the employer as a third 
party whenever the employee recovers funds from the employer in 
other legal proceedings.  Section 933(f), as set forth above, 
indicates that an employer only has to pay compensation benefits 
to the "person entitled to compensation" ("PETC") when the amount 
of the benefits to which the PETC is entitled under the LHWCA 
exceeds the net amount of money that the PETC has recovered from 
a third party.  If the employer/vessel owner is a third party, 
then any monies paid by the employer in the negligence suit can 
be used to offset the monies owed the PETC under the LHWCA.  If 
the employer/vessel owner is not considered to be a third party 
under § 933(f), then the employer is prohibited from deducting 
monies already paid. 
 It seems clear that if an employer is able to offset 
his liability under the LHWCA with monies previously paid by 
others under a tort settlement, then there is even stronger 
  
reason to allow the employer to offset monies paid in a tort 
settlement when the employer is the one who previously paid the 
monies.  Under § 933(f), an employer who settles a tort suit as a 
vessel owner must be construed as a third party.  To hold 
otherwise would create a perverse result:  an employer would have 
to pay a double recovery simply because he is the owner of the 
vessel, whereas if another party is the owner of the vessel and 
the employee settles with that third party for a net sum which 
exceeds the amount to which he is entitled under the LHWCA, the 
employer would pay nothing.  Thus, the net amount of $646,078 
that the Bundens received for settling the suit can be said to be 
an amount recovered against a third person and can be used by 
Brenneman to offset its liability under the LHWCA. 
 After concluding that § 933(f) was properly raised and 
that its third person setoff provision applies to Brenneman as 
the employer/vessel owner, we now turn to the discussion of how 
§§ 903(e) and 933(f), taken together, allow Brenneman a credit 
for the net amount of its tort settlement.  Section § 903(e) 
provides an employer with a credit for payments made under the 
Jones Act.24  Section § 933(f) states that an employer is 
required to pay under the LHWCA only the difference between its 
                     
24
.  Although § 903(e) provides for an offset for "any amounts 
paid," presumably we should consider the net, and not the gross, 
funds recovered from a Jones Act suit.  Otherwise, for example, a 
person entitled to $300,000 in compensation benefits under the 
LHWCA who receives a $301,000 gross recovery pursuant to the 
Jones Act would not be entitled to additional compensation 
despite a net recovery of only $200,667 (assuming a one-third 
deduction for attorneys' fees). 
  
LHWCA liability and the net amount recovered by the employee in 
suits against third parties for damages.  Whatever amount of the 
settlement is attributable to settlement of the Jones Act claim 
will be credited against Brenneman's LHWCA liability under § 
903(e).  Whatever amount of the settlement is attributable to 
settlement of the § 905(b) claim offsets Brenneman's liability in 
accordance with § 933(f).  Thus, no matter how the parties could 
have apportioned the settlement between the claims under the 
Jones Act and under § 905(b), and no matter who bears the burden 
of proving apportionment,25 Brenneman is entitled to a credit for 
the net settlement amount by virtue of the combined application 
of §§ 903(e) and 933(f).26      
 Notwithstanding the applicability of §§ 903(e) and 
933(f), these provisions must be applied to Barbara and Gregory, 
                     
25
.  See supra note 22. 
26
.  Remembering that the net settlement funds for the Bundens 
totalled $646,078 and assuming arguendo that the settlement funds 
were apportioned so that 50% of the money settled the Jones Act 
claim and 50% settled the § 905(b) claim, Brenneman would be 
entitled to a $323,039 credit under § 903(e) and a $323,039 
credit under § 933(f).  This would suffice to eliminate its 
$335,754 liability under the LHWCA.  Assuming arguendo that the 
settlement was apportioned 90% and 10% with regard to the Jones 
Act and § 905(b) claim, respectively, Brenneman would be entitled 
to a $581,470 credit under § 903(e) and a $64,608 credit under § 
933(f).  This also would suffice to eliminate its $335,754 
liability under the LHWCA.  Conversely, if it was a 10% and 90% 
apportionment, the result would be the same.  Finally, even 
assuming arguendo that the settlement was apportioned 100% and 0% 
with regard to the Jones Act and § 905(b) claim, respectively, 
Brenneman would be entitled to a $646,078 credit under § 903(e) 
and a $0 credit under § 933(f).  Again, this would suffice to 
extinguish its $335,754 liability under the LHWCA.  And, of 
course, if it was a 0% and 100% apportionment, the outcome would 
be identical.   
  
separately, since Barbara and Gregory are both "PETC" under § 
905(a) which lists separately "wife" and "dependents."  In 
analyzing the tort award, we note that $1,000,000 was recovered 
and was to be divided 70% to Barbara and 30% to Gregory.  After 
costs and attorneys' fees, the net amount awarded to Barbara and 
Gregory, respectively, was $452,255 and $193,823. 
 Under § 933(f), the employer is to pay a sum "equal to 
the excess of the amount which the Secretary determines is 
payable on account of such injury or death over the net amount 
recovered against such third person."  33 U.S.C. § 933(f) 
(emphasis added).  Likewise, to the extent that the employer does 
not receive a credit under § 903(e), it is required to make up 
the deficiency.  Under the LHWCA, Barbara and Gregory are 
entitled to $335,754 -- Barbara's share was $100,628 and 
Gregory's share was $232,205.   
   Thus, applying §§ 903(e) and 933(f) together to each 
of these separate claims, we note that Barbara received $452,255 
from her tort settlement and would be entitled to $100,628 from 
the LHWCA.  Since her recovery under the LHWCA does not exceed 
her net recovery from the third party suit, she is entitled to no 
additional funds under the LHWCA.  Gregory, on the other hand, 
received $193,823 from the tort settlement and is entitled to 
$232,205 from the LHWCA.  Since his recovery under the LHWCA 
exceeds his net recovery from the third party suit, he is 
  
entitled to an additional $38,382 from Brenneman under the LHWCA, 
barring any termination of benefits under § 933(g)(2).27 
 
 C.  Applicability of § 933(g)      
 Section 933(g)(1) applies to settlements with third 
persons where the settlement is for an amount less than the 
compensation to which the claimant would be entitled under the 
LHWCA.  It requires that the employee receive the written 
approval of the employer and the employer's carrier whenever the 
employee enters into a settlement for an amount less than the 
compensation that he or she is entitled to under the LHWCA. 
 The Board rejected Brenneman's defense under § 
933(g)(1), concluding that this subsection only applies where the 
amount recovered from a settlement is less than the amount of 
compensation due.  It reasoned that Barbara and Gregory Bundens 
received a net recovery of $646,078 from the federal court tort 
settlement, and would only be entitled to $335,754 under the 
LHWCA, an amount less than the net recovery from the one million 
dollar settlement.   
                     
27
.  The fact that Gregory is still entitled to $38,382 from 
Brenneman does not contradict our earlier conclusion that 
Brenneman was entitled to claim a credit for the full amounts it 
paid to Barbara and Gregory irrespective of the apportionment of 
the settlement between the Jones Act and LHWCA claims.  Instead, 
the remaining liability to Gregory stems from the allocation of 
the settlement between Barbara and Gregory and the operation of 
that allocation in § 933(f).  
 
   
  
 The Director argues that the Board made two errors in 
applying § 933(g).  First, the Board looked to the net settlement 
amount instead of the gross settlement amount when deciding 
whether Bundens had to obtain written approval of the settlement.  
Second, the Board treated the tort recovery of Barbara and 
Gregory as one settlement.  Instead, it should have considered 
Barbara and Gregory separately since both are "persons entitled 
to compensation" under the LHWCA. 
      Comparing the language of § 933(f) to § 933(g), we observe 
that whereas § 933(f) specifically refers to the "net amount 
recovered against such third person" (and even defines it), § 
933(g) refers simply to "a settlement . . . for an amount less 
than the compensation to which the person . . . would be 
entitled."  Thus, although Congress demonstrated its ability to 
specify "net amount" when it wanted to, it failed to do so in 
subsection (g).  "[W]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of 
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion."  Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza 
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (1987) 
(citations omitted).  Moreover, as the Supreme Court has stated, 
where "the plain meaning of th[e] statute appears to settle the 
question," a court should look to other sources "to determine 
only whether there is `clearly expressed legislative intention' 
contrary to the language, which would require [the court] to 
question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its 
  
intent through the language it chooses."  Id. at 432 n.12, 107 S. 
Ct. at 1213, n.12. 
 Additionally, the inclusion of "net" and its definition 
in § 933(f) was part of a comprehensive 1984 overhaul of § 933.  
During this revision, Congress rewrote four subsections, 
including § 933(g).  Although § 933(g) was elaborately recast, 
Congress did not elect to include the "net" language that it 
carefully placed in § 933(f). 
 Given the opportunity to redraft the statute, we might 
well have included the "net" language in § 933(g).28  However, 
                     
28
.  There are several compelling arguments for reading § 933(g) 
to mean "net." 
 First, as even the Director concedes, interpreting the 
term "settlement" as "gross settlement" will result in some cases 
where the employer owes a deficiency under § 933(f) without being 
given the opportunity to disapprove the settlement under § 
933(g)(1).  This could occur, for example, where the claimant is 
entitled to $500,000 in compensation benefits under the LHWCA and 
receives a $501,000 gross recovery ($334,000 net recovery, 
assuming a one-third deduction for attorneys' fees) from a third 
party settlement.  Under the Director's approach, the claimant 
would not be required to obtain the employer's and the carrier's 
written approval pursuant to § 933(g)(1), but the employer would 
be liable under § 933(f) for the shortfall between the $500,000 
and the $334,000.  Thus, the employer would be required to pay 
$166,000 without first having had the option of disapproving the 
settlement. 
 Second, no one subsection of a statute should be read 
in isolation.  Thus, there can be no meaningful interpretation of 
§ 933(g) without also considering other sections and subsections 
in the statute.  Although § 933(f) and § 933(g) are two separate 
subsections, they are meant to work in conjunction with one 
another.  In fact, the very language of § 933(g) directs the 
reader back to § 933(f).  Section 933(g) cannot be invoked and 
applied without also applying § 933(f).  That is to say, every 
time § 933(g) is implicated, you must necessarily apply § 933(f). 
 Third, this interpretation of § 933(g) comports with 
the overall scheme of § 933(f) and § 933(g) of ensuring that: (1) 
a claimant who recovers under a third party action never receives 
less than the claimant would be entitled to under the LHWCA 
  
because our task is to interpret, and not to create law, we are 
compelled to conclude that in applying § 933(g) the Board should 
consider the gross, and not the net, settlement funds.29   
   Applying § 933(g)(2) separately to Barbara and 
Gregory, we reach the following.  Because the $700,00030 gross 
settlement that Barbara received in the settlement exceeds the 
$100,628 that she would be entitled to under the LHWCA, she was 
not required under § 933(g)(1) to obtain the written approval of 
either the employer or the employer's carrier prior to the 
settlement.  And since the $300,000 that Gregory received was 
more than the $232,205 that he would be entitled to under the 
LHWCA, he too was not required to obtain the written approval of 
the employer or the employer's compensation carrier.   
 Although written approval was not required under § 
933(g)(1), the Board ruled that the § 933(g)(2) notice provision 
applied.  The Board found that this requirement was fulfilled 
(..continued) 
simply because the gross settlement exceeds the LHWCA benefits; 
and (2) an employer's written approval be required in a 
settlement proceeding, so that the employer is not required to 
pay additional benefits under the LHWCA where the claimant was 
not aggressive in pursuing his or her third party claim. 
29
.  In addition to the compelling statutory construction 
argument which prevails here, practical realities also militate 
against the "net" approach.  As the Director points out, a 
claimant may not be able to calculate the net settlement before 
accepting it, and thus may not know whether he needs to obtain 
the employer's consent.   
30
.  In supra notes 8-9 we stated that Barbara and Gregory 
recovered $1,000,000 in the settlement and it was apportioned 70% 
to Barbara and 30% to Gregory.  Thus, Barbara's gross recovery 
was $700,000 and Gregory's gross recovery was $300,000. 
  
here since Brenneman had been a party to the settlement 
agreement.  We agree.  Section 933(g)(2) requires that the 
employer receive notification of the third party settlement.  
Because Brenneman itself was a party to the third party 
settlement, the § 933(g)(2) notification requirement was clearly 
satisfied in this case.31  See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
Mobley, 920 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990) ("So long as the 
employer has notice of the settlement before it has made any 
payments and before the Agency orders it to make any payments, 
the purposes of [§ 933(g)(2)] are satisfied."). 
 Although the Board erred in interpreting § 933(g)(1), 
it reached the correct result in deciding that § 933(g)(1) did 
not apply.  Additionally, the Board did not err in holding that 
the notice provision of § 933(g)(2) was satisfied.  Thus, we will 
affirm the order of the Board on this issue.    
   
 CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the decision of the Board that: (1) the 
decedent was a harbor worker, not a seaman; (2) the "written 
approval" requirement of § 933(g)(1) does not apply, though we 
affirm on other grounds; and (3) the notice provision of § 
933(g)(2) was satisfied by virtue of the employer's participation 
in the tort settlement.  We will reverse the order of the Board 
                     
31
.  Additionally, as mentioned previously, Travelers was invited 
and declined to participate in the settlement negotiations.  
However, Travelers received notice of the settlement when copies 
of the Settlement and Release were sent to counsel for Travelers 
prior to the execution of these documents.  
  
that § 903(e) alone, or alternatively § 933(f) alone, provides a 
credit for the employer.  We hold that only when § 903(e) and § 
933(f) are combined does an employer receive a credit when the 
apportionment of funds between prior settled claims is unknown.  
In sum, because the Board erred in applying and interpreting 
various provisions of the LHWCA, we will remand this matter to 
the Board to re-calculate the compensation benefits owed to 
Gregory. 
